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The globalization of banking in the United States is influencing the monetary transmission mechanism
both domestically and in foreign markets. Using quarterly information from all U.S. banks filing call
reports between 1980 and 2005, we find evidence for the lending channel for monetary policy in large
banks, but only those banks that are domestically-oriented and without international operations. We
show that the large globally-oriented banks rely on internal capital markets with their foreign affiliates
to help smooth domestic liquidity shocks. We also show that the existence of such internal capital
markets contributes to an international propagation of domestic liquidity shocks to lending by affiliated
banks abroad. While these results imply a substantially more active lending channel than documented
in the seminal work of Kashyap and Stein (2000), the lending channel within the United States is declining
in strength as banking becomes more globalized.
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Monetary policy transmission through banks has long been noted as one of the 
key channels for policy effectiveness. Seminal work by Kashyap and Stein (1994, 1995, 
2000) shows that this lending channel differs across players within the banking system of 
the United States. While lending of small banks appear to be highly responsive to 
monetary policy shocks, the same is not true for larger banks. The main reason for the 
difference within the population – the authors argue - stems from the presumed greater 
ability of large banks to substitute reservable deposits with other external sources of 
funds, so that the shock to the liability side of their balance sheet from monetary policy is 
not transmitted to the asset side.   
The Kashyap and Stein results provide a mixed picture of the lending channel. 
While they indicate that such a channel exists, the effectiveness is also shown to be 
limited to the lending of the smaller banks. In an industry where the average size of banks 
has progressively increased, the lending channel seemed destined to a more marginal 
role. We re-examine the evidence on the lending channel in light of the considerable 
changes in the size and structure of U.S. banking in recent decades. Of particular focus is 
the observation that bank balance sheets have evolved significantly as a result of 
increased international activities.   
Figure 1 shows the share of total U.S. assets of banks that have global orientation, 
where we define a bank as having global orientation if it reports positive assets from 
foreign offices.
1 While global banks accounted for half of U.S. banking system assets 
through the early part of the 1990s, by 2005 they directly accounted for about seventy 
percent of U.S. banking system assets. The share of assets from foreign offices within the 
total assets of global banks is also of significant size. As Figure 2 shows, it has fluctuated 
between twenty and thirty percent of total assets over the recent decades.
2 We conjecture 
and show that this process of “globalization” of U.S. banking has had a deep and 
                                                 
1 For reporting purposes, foreign offices are branches or consolidated subsidiaries in a foreign country, 
International Banking Facilities, majority-owned Edge or Agreement subsidiaries. Moreover, a branch or 
consolidated subsidiary in Puerto Rico or a U.S. territory or possession is also considered a “foreign” office 
for reporting purposes.  
2 The reasons for bank globalization are posited to include search for risk-adjusted returns, as in Garcia-
Herraro and Medeiros (2007), and technological advances and institutional environments of home and host 
countries, as in Claessens and VanHoren (2008). 
  1pervasive impact on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Barring truly global 
events, banks with activities in multiple countries can reallocate funds in the event of a 
liquidity shock occurring either domestically or abroad. Our argument thus presumes that 
banking organizations actively operate internal capital markets, in which the global banks 
move liquid funds between domestic and foreign operations on the basis of relative 
needs. Hence, according to this conjecture the shock to reservable deposits caused by a 
change in monetary policy would be absorbed through internal sources of funding rather 
than exclusively through an attempt to access external capital markets. This theme is of 
interest to macroeconomics for the insights generated on the monetary transmission 
mechanism, to international finance for implications on the propagation of shocks across 
borders, and to corporate finance and banking studies by providing evidence of existing 
capital market frictions even for very large institutions. 
Using quarterly data for all U.S. banks between 1980 and 2005 we find evidence 
that large U.S. banks with a global presence are indeed insulated from domestic monetary 
policy shocks. We also find that it is exactly their global nature that allows insulation.  
Differently from any study on internal capital markets that we know of, in this particular 
case we are able to use data on actual internal flows of funds between a bank’s own 
domestic and foreign offices. We find that globally-oriented U.S. banks reallocate funds 
internally – and in a sizeable manner - in response to domestic monetary policy shocks. 
At the same time, large U.S. banks, but those with domestic-only activity, exhibit 
sensitivity to monetary policy. For these banks there does not seem to be complete 
frictionless access to alternative sources of funds, whether internal or external. Hence, 
size per se is not a sufficient trait to explain insulation. Rather it is the global nature of 
the bank that effectively determines (or at the very least highly contributes to) insulation 
from monetary policy. Our results thus indicate a stronger domestic lending channel than 
implicit in the seminal study of Kashyap and Stein (2000), since the lending activity of 
the large but non-global banks remain exposed to changes in monetary policy. At the 
  2same time, our results also suggest that the lending channel within the United States is 
declining in strength as banking becomes more globalized.
3 
Our results also show that the total lending channel consequences of U.S. 
monetary policy are underestimated by a focus that is solely concentrated on U.S. 
markets. We look at the response of lending of the foreign offices of U.S. global banks to 
a change in domestic monetary policy and find evidence consistent with the existence of 
an international mechanism of transmission of monetary policy. Hence, monetary policy 
through the lending channel may not be losing its effectiveness overall but, rather, it may 
be increasingly felt abroad and outside of the traditional field of observation. In this 
sense, our work directly complements the Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) findings that 
banks are specifically involved in the international transmission of shocks. In our case, 
results based on bank-specific data demonstrate a direct mechanism that may generate the 
type of monetary policy transmission across countries documented in analyses of 
macroeconomic data, as in Kim (2001), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and Canova (2005).
4  
Finally, it is worth noting that our findings introduce a new dimension to the 
debate on globalization effects on monetary policy and real activity in the United States. 
While contributors to this debate focus on issues like whether the Phillips Curve has 
flattened (for example, Yellen 2006, Bernanke 2006, Ihrig et al 2007, and Sbordone, 
2007), globalization of banking has consequences for the transmission of monetary policy 
to the real U.S. economy through the lending channel. 
  
II. The Logic and Estimation of the Lending Channel 
 
The main argument behind the lending channel of monetary policy, exposited in 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), is that tight money should reduce the volume of reservable 
                                                 
3 This work is closely related to others that have also suggested a reduced potency for monetary policy as a 
result of evolution of the banking industry (e.g., Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004), Ashcraft (2006) and 
Loutskina and Strahan, forthcoming).  
4 Kim (2001) provides evidence on international transmission of U.S. monetary policy shocks in the context 
of a VAR framework.  For transmission to emerging markets, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) emphasize the 
role of world interest rates in emerging market business cycles, and Canova (2005) focuses on transmission 
of US shocks to Latin American. Other studies highlight the role of exchange rate regime selection in such 
transmission, as in Di Giovanni and Shambaugh (forthcoming), Frankel, Schmukler and Serven (2004), and 
Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2005). 
  3deposits held by depository institutions.
5 The lending channel for the transmission of 
monetary policy arises because a bank faces a significant wedge between the cost of 
acquiring insured, reservable deposits and the cost of acquiring other sources of funds 
such as large denomination CDs, money market funds, and securities. Hence, a 
contractionary monetary policy that drains reserves from the economy and reduces the 
amount of reservable deposits, translates into a reduction in bank lending activity when 
banks are unable to replace each dollar of deposits with other funds  
Kashyap and Stein (2000) provide seminal evidence on the scale of the lending 
channel of monetary policy in the United States used data from the period from the late 
1970s through 1993.  They argued that lending by any bank is sensitive to its balance-
sheet health, with healthier banks able to lend a greater fraction of their assets, all else 
equal.  The extent to which banks can convert their balance sheet liabilities into lending 
also depends on general liquidity conditions in financial markets. The key Kashyap and 
Stein insight is that monetary policy influences lending activity by altering the sensitivity 
of lending to balance sheet health. Using the Call Report Data of individual U.S. banks,
6  
Kashyap and Stein showed that loan sensitivity to monetary conditions was statistically 
important for smaller banks in the United States, but not for the larger banks that 
presumably have a greater ability to raise alternative sources of funds from external 
sources in the event that the Federal Reserve restricts banking sector liquidity.  One main 
conclusion was that evidence for the lending channel was concentrated in a part of the 
banking system that accounts for a relatively small slice of overall U.S. bank lending. 
The role of sources of funds internal to banking networks was raised by Campello 
(2002), who demonstrated that even lending by small banks may be partially insulated 
from monetary policy shocks if they are part of banking networks.  Using data on 
individual U.S. banks between 1981 and 1997, Campello showed that the funding of new 
                                                 
5 Other basic references on the lending channel see Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995), Kashyap and Stein (1994, 1995, 2000). See Stein (1998) for specific modeling of the informational 
frictions on banks’ liability side. 
6 Banks file quarterly financial data to the FFIEC (Federal Financial Institution Examination Council), with 
the reports of Condition and Income commonly referred to as Call Report Data. 
  4loans by small banks that are members of bank holding companies is less dependent on 
bank’s own cash flow than is funding by independent or standalone small banks.
7 
Our empirical strategy follows from these insights on external and internal capital 
market access by different types of banks, and sets out to make three main points about 
the consequences of taking into account U.S. bank globalization. First, banks with a 
global outreach are in a better position to absorb liquidity shocks because of their unique 
ability to activate an internal capital market between their domestic and foreign offices. 
The implicit corollary is that otherwise similar banks without access to this potential 
internal source of funds may instead remain exposed to monetary policy changes. 
Second, the differences in the observed lending channel across domestic-only and global 
banks are not exclusively due to the differences in their size. We provide direct evidence 
of internal capital markets at work, with such flows compensating for the funding 
shortfalls. Third, the lending channel consequences of monetary policy are larger than the 
current conventional wisdom.  This arises both because of the large domestic-only banks 
that are influenced by U.S. monetary policy, and also because we demonstrate that the 
transmission of shocks appears through the lending activity done in foreign markets by 
affiliates of U.S. banks. As a final point, we also show that the internal capital markets 
argument applies to small banks in the United States, since those small banks that are part 
of a banking network containing global banks achieve insulation not afforded to small 
banks in domestic-only banking networks. 
 
Identification strategy 
We begin by assessing the degree of sensitivity to monetary policy of global 
banks and that of similar banks whose business is however confined within domestic 
boundaries. Because global banks are mainly large banks, we restrict our analysis to 
banks that in every quarter were in the upper five percent of the asset distribution of all 
U.S. banks. These are the banks that in Kashyap and Stein (2000) were all combined into 
a single group of banks and found to be insulated from monetary policy. We follow 
closely the two-step empirical strategy adopted by Kashyap and Stein (2000) and then 
                                                 
7 This line of research is closely related to the earlier work by Houston, James and Marcus (1997). 
Important extensions are the contributions by Ashcraft (2006), Ashcraft (forthcoming) and Ashcraft and 
Campello (2007). 
  5utilized and refined by Campello (2002). As in those studies, we estimate cross-sectional 
sensitivities of lending activity of banks to overall balance sheet liquidity at each date. In 
the first step of this empirical strategy, cross-sectional regressions for each quarter are run 
separately for banks indexed by i within each bank group. The bank groups that are the 
primary focus of our analysis are large global banks and the large, but domestic only, 
banks. The general stage 1 specification is: 
4
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where   is either total loans or commercial and industrial (C&I) loans of bank i at time t. 
C&I lending, by focusing on business lending, is perhaps a better indicator of the possible 
impact on the real economy of liquidity conditions affecting the banking industry. At the 
same time, focusing on just C&I lending may be overly restrictive in terms of the actual 
impact of liquidity, since different banks may have a different orientations in their asset 
portfolios and investing strategies.  
X On the right hand side, the main variable of interest is  − , which in this first 
empirical exercise is a measure of overall balance sheet liquidity and is defined as the log 
of the ratio of a bank’s liquid assets to its total assets. The estimated coefficient on X 1 it− , 
denoted by t β , reflects the degree of dependence of lending activity on balance sheet 
liquidity. Each regression is run at each quarter, thus generating a separate time series of 
estimated t β  coefficients for each class of banks under consideration. A bank’s 
capitalization ratio, its asset size, and the value of its non performing loans are included 
as bank-specific lagged controls. The vector of controls also includes indicator variables 
for the state where the bank headquarter is located and whether or not the headquarter is 
in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The inclusion of the state and MSA indicator 
variables allows for different macroeconomic conditions in each period for each 
geographical area and is intended to capture unobserved variability of loan demand.  
In the second step of this empirical strategy, the  t β  series estimated in the first 
step are used as dependent variables to determine how lending sensitivity varies with 
monetary policy. This second step, which follows Campello (2002), is summarized by the 
following specification:   
  68
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where  MP−  is an indicator of monetary policy. In our analysis we use three 
alternative indicators of monetary policy, each of which we describe at greater length in 
the data section: the Bernanke-Mihov indicator, the nominal Federal Funds rate, and the 
real Federal Funds rate. As a convention, these indicators of monetary policy are defined 
in our analysis so that they increase in times of liquidity tightening and decrease in times 
of looser liquidity conditions.  If lending is affected by monetary policy, lending will be 
more dependent on balance sheet liquidity in times of monetary policy tightening and less 
dependent in times of monetary policy loosening. Hence, the sum of the coefficients of 
the monetary policy indicators in the second-step regression would be positive and 
significant if the lending channel is active. The regression analysis includes as additional 
controls a time trend, three quarterly indicator variables, and the growth rate in real GDP 
and its lags.  
   The next main element of our analysis focuses on whether differences among the 
large global and large domestic banks are attributable to operable internal capital markets 
of the global banks. This element is needed, since our first set of results could merely 
reflect a size differential, since even within the top five percent in the asset distribution 
the median domestic banks are substantially smaller than the median global banks. 
Consequently a finding of limited or absent sensitivity to monetary policy could just be, 
as in Kashyap and Stein (2000), the result of better access to alternative sources of 
external funding.  
We are able to provide direct evidence that an internal capital market exists and 
that it is mobilized in response to domestic monetary policy changes. Normally data on 
internal transactions within an organization are unavailable in any systematic format, 
which is the reason why evidence on the existence of internal capital markets is typically 
derived indirectly by looking at the performance of one side of an organization in 
response to a (hopefully exogenous) shock to the other side. However, as part of their 
filing duties, U.S. banks are required to report quarterly the value of the net liabilities (or 
claims) between their domestic offices and their foreign offices. These balance sheet 
items record the aggregate value of all transactions between offices, including internal 
  7loans and borrowings.
8 A positive amount for  in a quarter implies that the 
domestic office of bank i has received a net inflow of funds from their foreign operations 




(3) i t j i tj j tj j tj t
jj j
Net Due Net Due MP GDP
If global banks are insulated from domestic liquidity shifts just because of their 
size, we should not expect to observe any abnormal behavior in the functioning of 
internal capital markets between parent banks and their foreign affiliates around times of 
changes in monetary policy. In order to test whether such an internal capital market is 
active for global banks, we use the following equation specification:  
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where  , the quarterly change in real Net Due funds for bank i at time t, is 
regressed on its own four lags, on the change in the indicator of monetary policy and its 
four lags, and the growth rate in real GDP and its four lags. Real Net Due is constructed 
by deflating nominal net due by the CPI, with 1980 as the CPI base year taking a value of 
100. The regression includes the growth rates in real GDP to control for general 
economic conditions. If the internal capital market is in operation – and it is used as at 
least a partial offset of domestic monetary policy shocks - we should expect to find an 
increase in the inflow of funds (or a decline in outflows of funds) from foreign operations 
in times of domestic monetary policy tightening.  This evidence of internal capital market 
response between the parent and foreign affiliates would be reflected in a positive and 
significant sum of coefficients  j φ on the monetary policy indicators. 
 The third set of key results that are provided on bank globalization and monetary 
transmission investigate the possible effects of domestic monetary policy on the lending 
activity of the foreign offices of global banks. If global banks operate an active internal 
capital market between their domestic and their foreign operations, then the lending 
activity of the foreign offices of these banks should be affected by domestic liquidity 
shocks. If an active internal capital market is in operation, the lending activity of the 
foreign offices should depend on the overall level of available liquidity of the domestic 
                                                 
8 Net Due To or From Own Related Offices in Other Countries is reported in schedule RC-H of Form 030 
(Call Report). 
  8head office. However, in times of monetary policy contraction foreign offices would have 
to rely less on the overall balance sheet strength of the domestic head office, and vice 
versa. The thought experiment is again based on the two-step procedure described above. 
In this case, however, in the first step the dependent variable is a measure of the lending 
activity of the foreign offices of bank i at time t. The alternative measures used are the 
growth in C&I lending of the foreign offices and the growth in total lending of the 
foreign offices. The main regressor of interest is the overall liquidity measure of the 
reporting bank.  
We present a fourth set of results as well, focused on the internal capital markets 
that exist, through bank holding companies, between the parent banks and affiliated small 
banks within the United States. The question considered is whether insulation differences 
observed across large domestic-only banks and globally-oriented U.S. banks extend to 
the small banks affiliated through common bank holding companies.  Methodologically, 
the empirical steps are analogous to those for equations (1) and (2), with the main 
exceptions of additional controls applied for the size of the large banks in the BHC.  
These results are included to address the existing work on internal capital markets and 
small banks, as presented by Campello (2002).  
 
III. The Data 
 
The sample of banks.  We examine data on banks and liquidity conditions for the period 
from 1980Q1 through 2005Q4. The core of our analysis utilizes Call Report data 
available quarterly for every chartered U.S. bank.
9  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics 
on the banks used for our analysis. Four categories of banks are covered in the table: 
large domestic banks, large global banks, small banks affiliated with a large global bank 
via common ownership under the same bank holding company (BHC) organization, and 
small bank in BHCs that contain large banks but no global banks. A large bank is defined 
as any bank that is in the 95th percentile or higher of banks sorted by asset size, with this 
                                                 
9 The specific details on the FFIEC 031 Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for a Bank with 
Domestic and Foreign Offices and FFIEC 041 Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for a Bank 
with Domestic Offices Only are available at http://www.ffiec.gov/forms031.htm and   
http://www.ffiec.gov/forms041.htm. 
  9categorization performed in every quarter of the sample period.  A small bank is defined 
as any bank that is in the 90
th percentile or lower. 
U.S. bank asset distribution is well-known to be highly skewed, so that even 
within the top 5 percent bracket there is a considerable size difference between banks in 
the top 1 percent and those between the 95
th and the 99
th percentile. Our definition of 
small banks, as those in the 90th percentile or smaller of banks sorted by asset size, 
differs from Kashyap and Stein (2000), who use a 95
th percentile cut-off.
10 We follow 
Campello (2002) in our sample choice, and, by leaving out the intermediate group of 
banks between the 90
th and 95
th percentile, impose a cleaner separation between small 
and large banks.  
The main balance sheet data of these types of banks are summarized in Table 1.  
The information presented covers the number of bank-quarter observations in the sample, 
median values for bank size, loan to asset ratios, C&I lending to assets, and bank 
liquidity, capitalization and nonperforming loan shares. The full sample of banks is 
described, as are the sub-samples containing the large domestic banks, the large global 
banks, the group of small banks affiliated with domestic bank holding companies, and the 
small banks affiliated with global bank holding companies. We use Call Report data on 
foreign assets and foreign liabilities of branches and subsidiaries to determine whether a 
bank is global or not. For reporting within the Table, three reference dates are considered, 
1985, 1995, and 2005, indicative of the respective decades covered by the full dataset. 
  The overall sample consists of more than 1.1 million bank-quarters of data. 
Within the group of banks represented, the large global and domestic banks have evolved 
to become larger on average and to represent more of the total assets of the banking 
sector. While large global banks are fewer in number, by 2005 they account for almost 70 
percent of banking system assets. Large domestic banks are more numerous but 
characterized by a substantially smaller median bank size. Those small banks that are 
                                                 
10 Kashyap and Stein (2000), for instance, reported separate results on the effects of monetary policy for 
banks below the 95
th percentile (their “small” banks), banks between the 95
th and the 99
th and banks in the 
top 1 percent. Their main result was to find a significant effect of monetary policy on small banks only, and 
mainly insignificant coefficients, or significant but with opposite sign, for the two largest groups of banks. 
Hence, their results indicated overall insulation from monetary policy for banks in the top 5 percent of the 
size distribution. We do not split our sample between banks in the 95
th to 99
th and banks in the top 1 
percentile. We already are performing a split between large domestic and large global, so that any further 
divisions would result in insufficient observations for a meaningful statistical comparison across groups.   
  10affiliated with large BHCs currently account for less than one percent of banking system 
assets.  
The global banks tend to have less liquid assets, lower capitalization, and higher 
nonperforming loan shares. The portfolios of the global banks tend to be similar in terms 
of loan to asset ratios, but commercial and industrial loans play a larger role in the 
business base.
11 The observations about differences in portfolios across the large banks 
are consistent with lessons from Berger et al. (2005), wherein it is argued that bank size is 
correlated with the bank business model: larger banks tend to lend at a greater distance, 
interact more at arms-length with their borrowers, and have shorter and less exclusive 
relationships with these borrowers.  
Two other forms of bank-specific data are central to our analysis, both particular 
to the global banks.  The first data are loans of foreign offices
12 and the second type is net 
due with foreign offices.
13 The lending of the foreign offices of U.S. global banks 
captures loans extended directly by offices in countries where they are physically located. 
These figures do not include possible lending activity of the domestic offices to clients 
residing abroad. The net due data reflects direct flows between a parent with its branches 
and subsidiaries abroad. Positive values represent flows from foreign operations to the 
parent bank located in the United States, and vice versa. 
Some features of the foreign loan and net due data are presented in Table 2, which 
primarily focuses on the means, medians and number of observations.  The first point to 
note is the consistent difference between means and medians, which are substantially 
smaller.  The implication is that the distribution of activity is highly skewed, with overall 
quantities dominated by a few large players.  Second, the net due observations are split 
across net due to (flows to the parent) and net due from (flows from the parent to foreign 
affiliates). In recent years, the flows from affiliates to parents have substantially exceeded 
flows in the opposite direction. Third, while foreign lending has risen – both total and 
C&I lending – the median bank is not engaged in this activity recently. This is dominated 
                                                 
11 The patterns are the same when small banks affiliated with global BHCs are compared with small banks 
affiliated with domestic BHCs. 
12 These data are from schedule RC-C of the Call Report, item RCFN 2122 (total loans) and RCFN 
1763+1764 (C&I loans). 
13 We construct these as the difference between schedule RC-H Net due to own foreign offices, Edge and 
Agreement subsidiaries, and IBFs and Net due from own foreign offices, Edge and Agreement subsidiaries, 
and IBFs (RC-H 2941-2163). 
  11by very large global banks, as reflected in the means across the years. While total foreign 
lending has been rising, domestic lending is rising at a higher rate, so that foreign loans 
are declining as a share of total bank lending. The direction of flows from foreign 
affiliates to parents, reflected in net due to statistics, show that affiliated foreign banks 
have assets abroad that tend to be directed to U.S. markets.  
 
Macroeconomic Liquidity.  Three measures of market liquidity, proxied by measures of 
monetary policy, are used in our analysis: a nominal Federal Funds rate, a real Federal 
Funds rate (the nominal rate adjusted for CPI inflation), and the Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998) measure.
14 The quarterly effective Federal funds rate is calculated from monthly 
data from the Federal Reserve Board. The Bernanke-Mihov measure is constructed via a 
“semi-structural VAR” model of the market for bank reserves. We use an oppositely 
signed Bernanke-Mihov series compared to the published measure, so that its 
interpretation is similar to the Federal Funds series. In all cases, our empirical results 
enter these variables so that an increase in the monetary measure is interpreted as a 
tightening of liquidity conditions.  
These three measures are depicted in Figure 3. In terms of the values of these 
series, positive values of our Bernanke-Mihov metric and of the real Federal Funds rates 
are considered periods of tight monetary policy. Upward movements in all three 
measures generally are considered indicative of tighter policy. Of course, the real Federal 
Funds rate can be tighter either due to an explicit rise in the nominal policy rate, or from 
a reduction in inflation while the nominal rate remains unchanged. The Bernanke-Mihov 
measure can reflect tighter liquidity conditions that are generated from policy instruments 
other than the Funds rate.
15 
                                                 
14 Bernanke and Mihov (1998) applied a flexible VAR model which nested specific assumptions about 
central bank operating procedures, such as whether it is based on federal funds rate or non-borrowed 
reserves targeting. Ilian Mihov kindly updated and revised this measure in 12/06 using data through the end 
of 2005. The Kashyap and Stein (2000) study uses a narrative measure of monetary policy, the Boschen-
Mills (1995) index, the Federal Funds rates, and the Bernanke and Mihov measure.  Kashyap and Stein 
(2000) do not use a real Federal Funds rate. 
15 The differences in definition and construction across these measures generate positive but not necessarily 
tight correlations among them, as reported in Appendix Table 1. The tightest correlations are among the 
nominal and real Federal Funds rate series, which have a common policy base but differ in terms of 
correction for slower moving inflation. The real rate is consistently lower in value and trends downward by 
less through these decades as average inflation has declined. The trajectory of the Bernanke-Mihov 
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Data screens.  For our regression analysis we apply a number of screens to the data.  
These screens follow closely those of Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Campello (2002). 
We drop bank quarters in which mergers or changes in “high holder” within a BHC 
occur. We drop bank quarters where asset growth was above 100 percent and total loan 
growth was above +50 percent or below –50 percent. In regressions where we focus on 
C&I lending, we remove similar outliers in the C&I lending growth distribution. Finally, 
for regressions analyzing the lending of foreign offices we dropped outliers at the 1
st and 
99
th percentile of either the series of growth in total and C&I lending of foreign offices. 
 
IV.  Empirical Findings 
The Lending Channel in Domestic versus Global Large Banks. As described above, the 
first empirical exercise tests how lending sensitivity to balance sheet liquidity varies with 
monetary policy for different categories of banks. Our main comparison is between large 
banks with international operations, our global banks, and those banks that instead 
operate exclusively within domestic boundaries.  
Table 3 presents the results from the second stage regressions run on these two 
subsets of banks. Each cell within the table presents the summed coefficient on monetary 
policy and is generated from a distinct regression. The table is divided into two panels, 
representing regressions over the distinct dependent variables for loans. The upper panel 
reports estimated summed coefficients where the first stage regressions used growth in 
total loans as the dependent variable, while the lower panel reports estimated coefficients 
using growth in C&I loans.  Within each of the panels we report results of separate 
regression specifications run using one of the three alternative indicators of monetary 
policy, and which either exclude or include controls for GDP growth in the second stage 
regression. In total, Table 3 summarizes results from twenty-four regressions: twelve for 
                                                                                                                                                 
measure is more tightly correlated with the nominal Federal Funds rate than the real rate, perhaps not 
surprising since the nominal rate enters the VAR used in constructing the Bernanke-Mihov measure. 
Despite this pattern in correlations reflecting changing liquidity conditions, the B-M and real rates have 
more comparable direct signals regarding absolute liquidity conditions, namely, whether policy is monetary 
policy is loose or tight at any point in time.  
 
  13large, global banks and twelve for large, domestic banks. Results highlighted in bold are 
those where monetary policy consequences for lending are statistically significant at the 
10 percent level and which indicate an active lending channel for monetary policy. 
First, consider the results in the second set of columns of Table 3, which are based 
on regression analysis over the sample of large, global banks. The sums of coefficients 
are never significant at standard significance levels. In these banks we do not observe the 
lending channel of monetary policy transmission at work. The more surprising results are 
provided in the first set of columns, which reflect the effects of liquidity measures on 
bank balance sheets and lending by large, but domestic-only banks. Strikingly, in seven 
out of twelve of the regressions the sums of coefficients are statistically significant and 
positive, and marginally significant in one additional specification. This finding of a 
substantive effect of monetary policy on lending by large banks contrasts with the 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) results, which had pooled together the large domestic and large 
global banks. Our results show that when the large bank sample is split along domestic 
versus global lines, tighter monetary policy is significantly associated with more binding 
balance sheet constraints on large banks, but only on the domestically-oriented group of 
banks.  
This set of results provides an important insight into the Kashyap and Stein 
(2000) result that large banks are shielded from monetary policy shocks because of their 
innate ability to freely access alternative sources of funds. This access to external capital 
markets is not completely frictionless for large banks:  once we remove the banks with 
global operations from the cluster of large banks, size itself may not be a sufficient trait 
to provide insulation. Stated differently, this result can be evidence that in fact globalness 
is a trait that helps explain why the aggregated class of large banks seems to be insulated 
from monetary policy. Later in Section IV we turn to the economic significance of these 
findings and the strength of our documented internal capital markets within global banks 
in explaining the difference between the domestic and global large banks.  
 
Flows Between Global Banks and Their Foreign Affiliates. If globalness is such a trait, 
one challenge is to identify the means through which global banks achieve this. As we 
have noted, one way global banks can do this is by maintaining an active internal capital 
  14market that potentially allows them to reshuffle resources between domestic and foreign 
operations depending on the relative liquidity needs within the banking organization.  To 
determine whether this channel is active, we use equation specification (3), on the “net 
due” from foreign operations to the parent and report the results in Table 4.  In all 
regressions the dependent variable is the change in net due flows between a bank 
domestic headquarter and its foreign offices, with the net due flows deflated to be 
expressed in constant 1980 dollars. Recall that, by construction, an increase in net due 
means that the domestic offices are receiving more funds from their foreign offices or 
sending fewer resources abroad.  
The results reported in the first column of Table 4 show that the pattern of funds 
flow responds to changes in monetary policy, and this effect is statistically significant. In 
particular, this evidence indicates that an active internal capital market between the 
domestic headquarter and its foreign offices exists. The next columns of results consider 
the size and statistical significance of the effect under periods of tighter versus under 
looser monetary conditions, testing for potential asymmetries. The transmission of U.S. 
liquidity conditions onto net-due flows is bi-directional.  The results show that funds flow 
into the parent bank at a faster pace when domestic monetary policy is tighter, and funds 
flow out to the affiliates, or into the parent from the affiliate at a slower pace, when 
domestic monetary policy is more expansionary. Tests performed for equality across the 
asymmetric coefficients show that none of the specifications yield a statistically 
significant difference between estimated size of net due response to tightening versus 
loosening of credit conditions.  Consequently, the empirics reject the notion that an 
internal capital market between U.S. banks and foreign affiliates is active only in one 
direction of monetary policy conditions.  
 
Internal Capital Markets and Lending by Foreign Affiliates. Our observation that foreign 
affiliates help insulate global banks against domestic liquidity shocks does not mean that 
the total consequences of U.S. monetary policy are smaller than would be the case 
without globalization. While some insulation occurs in U.S. domestic markets, 
transmission of U.S. monetary shocks can be magnified on foreign markets. Indeed, the 
economic impact of the same amount of inflows and outflows can be markedly different 
  15from the domestic lending and foreign perspectives. Since the total foreign lending 
portfolios are typically much smaller than the total domestic loan portfolios (Table 2), the 
impact of a given outflow on the lending of foreign offices would be proportionately 
much larger than the impact of an equally sized inflow on domestic lending. 
We explore the potential impact of changes in U.S. monetary policy for lending 
activity abroad by the affiliates of U.S. banks using the bank-specific data on foreign 
loans. Again, if global banks are insulated from domestic monetary policy shocks 
because of their ability to redirect liquid funds across borders, we should expect that the 
lending activity of the foreign offices of such banks to be directly affected by domestic 
shocks. Evidence supporting this conjecture would provide a direct channel through 
which domestic monetary policy is transmitted internationally, supporting the type of 
spillovers of policy established in VAR studies that exclusively rely on macroeconomic 
data.  
The empirical strategy relies on the expectation that, with operable internal capital 
markets, foreign lending is likely to depend on the strength of the balance sheet of the 
domestic office. Consequently, we test whether such degree of dependence varies with 
the conditions of domestic monetary policy. The regression specifications cover growth 
in C&I lending of foreign offices, shown in the first set of columns of Table 5, and Total 
Foreign Lending, shown in the second set of columns of Table 5. As in Table 3, the 
reported results are the summed effects across quarters of a change in U.S. monetary 
variables, with the cells of the table drawn from regression specifications that are 
inclusive or exclusive of controls for real GDP growth. 
The pattern of results reported in Table 5 is highly consistent across specifications 
and across the coverage of the foreign lending variable. The estimated sums of 
coefficients are always negative and are significant in nine out of the twelve regressions. 
The implication is that foreign lending activity of U.S. bank affiliates abroad can rely less 
on the overall strength of the home office in times of tighter monetary conditions in the 
United States, and rely more on the U.S. parent in times of looser U.S. liquidity.  
 
Internal Capital Markets and Lending by Domestic Affiliates.  As a final set of regression 
exercises, we test whether the impact of globalization also extends to the lending activity 
  16of small size banks operating within the United States. Campello (2002) had argued that 
while it must be true that smaller banks are restricted in their ability to raise alternative 
sources of external finance – as argued by Kashyap and Stein - it is also true that a 
number of small banks are linked to large ones via bank holding company affiliation. 
Campello successfully showed that these small banks remain insulated from monetary 
policy shocks because they can access internal funds that can be reallocated within the 
bank holding company organization. The Campello results made another dent to the 
effectiveness of the lending channel by excluding a whole other group of banks from 
potential effects. In light of our main results, we revisit this conclusion with the 
expectation that the degree of insulation may be different for small banks that are 
associated with large and global banks, compared with insulation afforded those 
associated with large but domestic-oriented banks.  
The identification is achieved with the same two-step procedure described above 
through equations (1) and (2). However, following very closely Campello (2002), in this 
case in the first stage we estimate the sensitivity of lending activity of the small banks to 
their own internally-generated income and then in the second stage measure how such 
sensitivity varies with monetary policy. The intuition is that small banks associated with 
banks that are insulated by liquidity shocks should not be in need, or should be less in 
need, of their own internally generated income to fund lending activity. If these small 
banks cannot rely on funds reallocation provided by the larger, better insulated affiliates, 
their lending activity will be more dependent on their own income and such dependence 
will be even higher in times of tighter monetary policy. As before, the first stage 
regressions include as bank-specific lagged controls a bank capitalization ratio, its size, 
and the value of its non-performing loans, together with state and MSA indicator 
variables. In addition, we include controls for the overall size of the large banks in the 
BHCs to which each bank i belongs. These controls are the lagged values of the log of the 
sum of total assets of all large banks in the BHC, and its squared term. 
Table 6 reports the results of second stage regressions for these two new groups of 
banks. The first set of columns refer to estimated coefficients from the regressions run on 
the subset of small banks affiliated with large, domestic banks, while the second set of 
columns refer to regressions run on the subset of small banks affiliated with large, global 
  17banks.  The second set of columns shows that small banks affiliated with large, global 
banks appear to be insulated from liquidity shocks. In all cases, with any indicator of 
monetary policy, looking at total lending or just C&I lending, and including or excluding 
GDP controls, the estimated sums of coefficients are never positive and significant. In 
fact, they are actually negative and significant in three of the regressions with total loans 
as dependent variable. By contrast, the results for small banks affiliated with large, 
domestic banks are markedly different. In eleven of the twelve alternative specifications 
the sums of coefficients from the second stage regressions are positive and significant, 
indicating that these small banks need to rely more on their own internal funds in times of 
liquidity shortage. The implication is that the small banks affiliated with domestic-only 
BHCs appear to remain exposed to changes in U.S. liquidity conditions, an indication that 
the large banks in their organizations may not be sufficiently shielded to be able to 
activate a meaningful reallocation of resources to their small affiliates through the 
organization’s internal capital market.   
 
Overall potency of the lending channel.  The analyses presented above using bank-
specific data provide very clear qualitative lessons on the consequences of globalization 
of banks for the lending channel. In this section, we pull together those empirical results 
in order to gauge both their quantitative economic significance and the role of internal 
capital markets in global banks in explaining differences across the large banks. We 
undertake exercises similar to those in Kashyap and Stein (2000), computing the impact 
on growth in lending occurring over a period of 8 quarters of a 100 basis points change in 
the nominal federal funds rate.  
Because the identification strategy relies on banks being liquidity constrained, we 
assume that banks are liquidity constrained if they are below the 90
th percentile in the 
liquidity-to-asset ratio distribution for each separate group of banks that we analyzed. 
From each subset of banks below this threshold, we take the median value in the 
liquidity-to-asset ratio and evaluate the economic impact of the monetary policy change 
at this point in the distribution.
16 
                                                 
16 Kashyap and Stein (2000) calculated the integral over the entire distribution of banks at the given point in 
time. Our exercise is simpler but it is still informative.  
  18For all of the quantitative exercises, we use the estimated coefficient from the 
regressions with the added GDP growth controls and using the nominal Federal Funds 
rate. Consider C&I lending by large banks first. The estimated sum of coefficients on 
monetary policy from this specification is 0.0012, as reported in Table 3.
17 From 
examining the Call Report data, across large domestic banks the value of the liquidity-to-
asset ratio at the 90
th percentile is 0.40 and the median value for banks below the 90
th 
percentile threshold is 0.19 (in logs equal to -1.64).  Hence, a 100 basis point tightening 
of the nominal federal funds rate would result in a decline in C&I lending growth by 0.2 
percentage points for the median bank (0.0012 × -1.64). Since the median quarterly C&I 
loan growth for this bank group over our sample period was 1.7 percent, the Federal 
Funds tightening would reduce the median growth rate to 1.5 percent, or by about 12 
percent of the median value. The same exercise applied to total lending would instead 
find a 0.13 percentage points decline in the total lending growth rate (0.008 x 1.64). Since 
the median total loan growth rate was 1.9 percent, the monetary tightening would reduce 
median total loan growth to 1.77 percent, or about 7 percent of the median value.  
Recall the key result that the global banks were not significantly affected by 
monetary policy variables and the conjecture that the net dues adjustment, representing 
internal capital markets at work within the globalized banks, provides the offset on the 
liability side of the balance sheet so that asset side adjustments through loans do not 
occur. In the next paragraphs we compute the quantities of loan adjustment that would 
have occurred for the global banks if they did not have this net due offset and compare 
these quantities with the estimated net due changes. 
Consider the magnitude of a change in net due flows in response to a 100 basis 
point increase in the nominal Federal Funds rate. The estimated sum of the coefficients 
on the monetary policy variable for that model specification was equal to 189.07. Since 
the net due variable was expressed in real 1980 dollars, we convert back into nominal 
terms using the CPI deflator. For instance, consider the effect at the most current data 
point, the fourth quarter of 2005, where the multiplication factor for the CPI deflator was 
                                                 
17 These coefficients indicate the change in the sensitivity of lending growth to liquidity,  the estimated β’s 
from the first-stage regressions. The sizes of the coefficients in the various specifications are comparable to 
the means of the β’s for each corresponding group of banks. For instance, a change in sensitivity by 0.0012 
is large compared to the mean of the estimated β’s for large domestic banks, which was equal to 0.0032. 
Similar magnitude comparisons apply for the other bank groups. 
  19250.7. Then the total effect of a 100 basis point tightening on the quarterly change in net 
due flows is equals to $47.4 million (189.07 x 250.7), with net due variables in the 
empirical exercise expressed in thousands of dollars.  This figure is within the range of 
typical fluctuations in net due flows across the global banks and their subsidiaries. For 
example, in the fourth quarter of 2005 the median size of a change in net dues, whether 
inflows or outflows, was $15 million, while the absolute size of net due for the median 
bank was $74 million. Hence, the evidence suggests that global banks mobilize 
substantial funds in their internal capital markets.  
However, to establish that these funds matter for the liquidity needs of global 
banks we need a benchmark for what the monetary tightening would have done to banks 
in the absence of the foreign-sourced funds. As a hypothetical exercise, we apply to the 
group of large global banks the quantified impact of monetary tightening that had been 
calculated for large, but domestic-only banks. To obtain a direct comparison with the 
calculated response in net due flows, we look at the potential impact on total lending of 
the median, liquidity constrained, large and global bank in the fourth quarter of 2005. In 
this quarter, the median bank reported about $21 billion in total loans. Using the 
coefficient estimated for the group of large, domestic banks, the median, constrained 
global banks would experience a potential loss in total lending growth of about $63 
million.
18 Hence, the estimated magnitude of the response of net due flows for the 
median global bank from our monetary policy experiment can deliver the additional 
funds needed to insulate the liability side of the bank balance sheet and mitigate the type 
of lending reduction occurring in domestic-only banks due to tighter domestic funding 
conditi
                                                
ons. 
In terms of lending spillovers from large banks, we can assess the domestic 
consequences across affiliated small banks and affiliated foreign branches and 
subsidiaries. For the economic impact on lending of small banks, we use the estimated 
coefficients from Table 6. An increase of 100 basis points produces a decline in C&I loan 
growth of 0.4 percentage points for the small domestic banks affiliated with a domestic-
only BHC. Considering the median in C&I loan growth for the bank group was 0.7 
 
18 Computed as follows: The 90
th pct in log(liquid asset ratio) for large global in 2005q4 = -2.00. Median of 
those banks below this threshold = - 4.01. Impact on total lending = 4.01 *0.0008 = 0.003. Total lending for 
median, constrained, large global bank = 21Bn. Loss = 21Bn*0.003 = 63Mn. 
  20percent, the monetary tightening effect corresponds to 57 percent of the median value of 
loan growth. For total lending, the change in loan growth was calculated to be equal to 
0.28 percentage points, corresponding to 19 percent of the median value in loan growth. 
These contractionary lending effects from monetary tightening are not evident in the 
small b
th percentile of either loan growth 
distribu
 magnitude of this 
effect f
anks that are part of a BHC with large global banks. 
For the transmission of U.S. monetary policy to foreign loans through global 
banks we use Table 5 estimates and conclude that the economic significance of U.S. 
monetary policy on foreign lending is potentially large. The increase in the Federal Funds 
rate would reduce C&I lending of foreign offices by about 3 percentage points and reduce 
total lending of foreign offices by 2.2 percentage points. Over the entire sample period, 
the median values in both C&I and total lending growth for foreign offices were actually 
negative (-1.2 and -0.3 percent, respectively). Monetary tightening in the United States 
would thus slow lending abroad to an even greater extent. The effect would still be 
considerable even for a foreign office at the 75
tion (+ 5.9 and + 6.1 percent, respectively). 
In sum, our study confirms that the ongoing process of globalization of the 
banking industry impacts the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The aggregate 
impact is not trivial: total lending in the fourth quarter of 2005 was approximately $4.8 
trillion. Of this total amount, $3.1 trillion were issued by large, global banks. Hence, 
about 65 percent of total lending is largely insulated, at least in terms of direct effects, 
from changes in monetary policy. On the other hand, we find that there is evidence of 
sensitivity to monetary policy among the remaining large domestic institutions. In 
2005Q4 the overall lending of this bank category amounted to about $1 trillion. Hence, 
our “reclaiming” about 25 percent of large bank loans to the potential lending channel 
effects seems economically significant, even if the coefficient on the
or these banks only changes loan growth by a modest amount.  
Continuing with the domestic lending channel consequences, if we add to this 
large number the results from lending channel effects through the small banks affiliated 
with large domestic banks, the lending channel emerges even more potent than 
previously estimated. Going back to the aggregate evaluation, in the fourth quarter of 
2005 the total lending of small banks affiliated with large banks was about $31 Billion. 
  21Of this grand total, $21 Billion came from small banks affiliated with large, domestic-
oriented ones. Consequently, about 66 percent more lending of small banks are 
potentially affected through the lending channel than previously suggested.  While this 
lending figure is an order of magnitude smaller than the one calculated for large banks, its 
economic significance cannot be discounted both due to the size of the estimated median 
loan growth response for the banks and the observation that small banks serve principally 
small and medium size enterprises, which in turn have a central role in the overall engine 
of U.S. economic growth. These consequences are just the domestic ones, with the 
lending
mount of new lending that is affected by monetary policy through the 
lending channel. 
 
 channel also transmitted abroad through affiliated banks. 
As a final remark, while we are showing that globalization has a first-order impact 
on the conduct of monetary policy and that the lending channel is stronger than estimated 
without taking this process into account, our analysis highlights time variation in these 
effects. The potency of the lending channel evolves as the banking industry trends toward 
increasing globalization. In 1995, large global banks issued about 55 percent of total 
loans, as opposed to about 65 percent of total loans in 2005. Suppose the estimated 
parameters from our regression exercises were stable over time, and consider the 
counterfactual of an increase in the share of global banks by another 10 percentage 
points, to 75 percent of total domestic lending. For a lower bound on this impact, we 
assume that total lending issued by non-global banks, large or small, has the sensitivity to 
monetary policy estimated for the large banks, at 0.13 percent, as in the numerical 
exercise described after Table 3.  Total lending by non-global banks was about $1.8 
trillion in the fourth quarter of 2005. Assuming a median loan growth rate of 1.9 percent, 
an increase in the Federal Funds rate of 100 basis points would reduce loan growth by 
about 7 percent, “shaving” loan growth by about $2.3 billion over eight quarters. If the 
share of total lending issued by global banks were instead 75 percent of the current $4.8 
trillion, monetary tightening would have instead reduced lending by about $1.56 billion. 
While this is still the same 7 percent reduction in loan growth, it amounts to a 33 percent 
reduction in the a
 





th large domestic banks or large global banks through bank holding 
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Our goal was to investigate whether there is evidence that globalization of 
banking is changing the transmission of monetary policy via the lending channel. Our 
conclusion is that globalization has a deep and pervasive impact on the transmission of 
monetary policy. Using bank-specific data over the period between 1980 and 2005 we 
have found evidence of differences in the lending channel across large banks. While large 
banks are typically considered to be insulated from monetary policy, once global banks 
are separated from this group of large banks, the remaining domestic-oriented
ignificant sensitivity to monetary policy in support of the lending channel.  
Insulation of large global banks relative to large domestic-only banks arises due to 
a functioning internal capital market between globalized parents in the United States and 
their foreign affiliates. We demonstrate this point by showing that the net due flows 
between parents and affiliates respond to U.S. monetary policy. Globalness is part of the 
insulation of large banks from domestic liquidity shocks, with this form of insulation 
apparently unavailable to the domestic only banks. Some of these differences in the 
lending channel across banks also extend to small banks, depending on whether they are 
affiliated wi
ies.  
The consequences of these results are statistically and economically significant.  
The mechanisms we identify imply that, under globalization, the impact of the liquidity 
shock on domestic bank lending and on the U.S. economy as a whole will be attenuated, 
while at the same time the domestic shock is transmitted more broadly to foreign markets 
through affiliated banks. Using bank-specific data, we show that the lending of foreign 
offices of U.S. banks is affected by U.S. monetary policy, and these foreign offices can 
rely less on support from parent bank balance sheets in times of tighter liquidity 
conditions in the United States.  While the domestic impact of monetary policy through 
the lending channel may have diminished over time as globalization progressed, our other 
observation that this channel influences foreign 
 of effects of domestic liquidity changes.   
  23Our results also indicate that access to external capital markets may not be 
frictionless if large, domestic-oriented banks display a significant degree of sensitivity to 
their own balance sheet liquidity, and if large, global banks make use of their 
international, internal channel in response to monetary policy. Understanding the 
dynamics of international, intra-bank funding adds important insights to our 
understanding of banks’ response to liquidity shocks and it should therefore assist in the 
undertaking of effective policy making. As a case in point, the response of U.S. global 
banks in the aftermath of the liquidity crisis during the summer of 2007 indicates a 
significant use of internal funds even during such an event. Our calculation shows that 
internal borrowings of global banks from foreign operations jumped from pre-crisis 
averages and financed more than 20 percent of domestic asset growth during the second 
half of 2007 for these banks, a figure almost doubled from pre-crisis averages. Hence a 
banking system that grows increasingly global may have enhanced resilience and self-
adjustment in times of liquidity crisis. However, it may not rule out broader international 
propag
ding channel could differ depending on whether 
the constellation of partners in banking contains countries that directly tie their monetary 
olicies to those of the United States.  
 
ations of shocks and perhaps a more limited scope for isolated intervention by 
national policy authorities. 
As a concluding remark, in principle the importance of the internal capital 
markets across globalized parents and their foreign affiliates may be predicated on the 
regulatory and macroeconomic regimes at home and abroad. For the channels we identify 
the role of the foreign policy regimes warrants further careful study. The potential for 
viewing foreign markets as a liquidity buffer against U.S.-generated liquidity shocks may 
rely on the presumption that the cost of capital in foreign markets does not move in step 
with the U.S. federal funds rate. In this case, it may be that those branches and 
subsidiaries in countries in where currencies are not pegged to the dollar are the ones that 
play the dominant liquidity buffer role. Indeed, existing studies using macroeconomic 
data already identify differences in monetary regimes on monetary policy transmission 
across markets that are associated with exchange rate regime.  The implication is that 
globalization consequences for the len
p
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  27Data Appendix. 
 
Net due to and Net due from items are located on schedule RC-H--Selected Balance 
Sheet Items for Domestic Offices of the CALL report (FFIEC 031, page 24) 
 
Item Number 2941: NET DUE TO OWN FOREIGN OFFICES, EDGE AND 
AGREEMENT SUBSIDIARIES, AND IBFS 
 
Data Description: The position of the domestic offices of the bank relative to all of the 
bank's Edge and Agreement subsidiaries, foreign branches, consolidated foreign 
subsidiaries, and branches in Puerto Rico and U.S. territories and possessions. All intra-
bank transactions of the domestic offices with these other offices of the bank, including 
investments (both equity and debt) in consolidated subsidiaries (foreign and domestic), 
are reflected here, since all other items are reported on a fully consolidated basis and 
excludes all intra-bank transactions. A single net amount for all the intra-bank due to and 
due from positions of the domestic office is calculated and entered either in "Net Due 
from Own Foreign Offices, Edge and Agreement Subsidiaries, and IBFs (2163)" or this 
item, depending on whether the single net amount is a net due from or a net due to 
balance. 
 
Item Number 2163: NET DUE FROM OWN FOREIGN OFFICES, EDGE AND 
AGREEMENT SUBSIDIARIES, AND IBFS 
 
Data Description: 
The position of the domestic offices of the bank relative to all of the bank's Edge and 
Agreement subsidiaries, foreign branches, consolidated foreign subsidiaries, and 
branches in Puerto Rico and U.S. territories and possessions. All intra-bank transactions 
of the domestic offices with these other offices of the bank, including investment (both 
equity and debt) in consolidated subsidiaries (foreign and domestic), are reflected here, 
since all other items are reported on a fully consolidated basis and exclude all intra-bank 
transactions. A single net amount for all the intra-bank due to and due from positions of 
the domestic offices is calculated and entered either in "Net Due to Own Foreign Offices, 
Edge and Agreement Subsidiaries, and IBFs (2941)" or this item, depending on whether 
the single net amount is a net due from or a net due to amount. 
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Real Fed Funds Rate
 
The Bernanke-Mihov index has been modified from the original so that all three monetary policy indicators 
signal tightening when they increase. 
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Table 1: Basic Balance Sheet Information for U.S. Banks 
                          
           
 1985  CPI   146.3802641  62,269 996,951  5,123,663  93,897  102,967 
           










Total number of bank observations (1980Q1-2005Q4)  1,162,969  43,921  14,252  41,339  47,640 
Median values for bank asset size (thousands 2005USD)                
 1995  CPI 209.4354703  73,906 1,775,889  10,358,585  142,711  134,766 
 2005  CPI 267.6469194  105,223 2,236,512  22,300,000  213,294 213,157 
Share of each bank group in total assets (%)                
 1985      100.0  16.6  56.0  1.4  2.2 
 1995      100.0  22.6  56.1  1.0  0.9 
 2005      100.0  17.9  67.9  0.4  0.3 
Median total loans / assets (%)    55.6  61.1  60.4  57.1  55.5 
Median C&I loans / assets (%)    17.3  22.8  35.4  18.4  21.0 
Median bank liquid assets / total assets (%)  28.0  26.5  20.1  16.6  27.1 
Median capitalization ratio (%)    8.7  7.2  6.4  8.0  7.6 
Value of nonperforming loans/ total loans (%)  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.6  0.8 
          
Data is from quarterly Call Report forms for all banks from 1980Q1 to 2005Q4. A bank is defined as global in a quarter if it reports positive foreign assets. A bank is 
defined as domestic if all its activity comes from offices located domestically. Large banks are those with total assets above the 95
th percentile of the total asset 
distribution in each quarter. Small banks are those with total assets below the 90
th percentile of the total asset distribution in each quarter. Small banks in domestic BHCs 
are small banks affiliated in BHCs with at least one large, domestic bank and no global banks. Small banks in global BHCs are small banks affiliated in BHCs with at 
least one large global bank. 
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Table 2   Net due flows and Foreign Loans 
(Thousands 2005 USD) 
 
 
 1985q4  1995q4  2005q4 
Net due flows       
     Net due to        Median  62,279  299,162  657,339 
                              Mean  304,304  955,710  3,856,075 
                              Number of observations  60  103  62 
     Net due from    Median  43,264  3,934  852 
                              Mean  458,316  332,548  983,989 
                              Number of observations  187  67  45 
     (Net due to – Net due from)        
                              Median absolute value   47,285  141,930  74,356 
                              Mean absolute value   420,904  710,111  2,648,189 
                              Number of observations  247  170  107 
Loans of Foreign Offices       
    Total loans        Median value across banks   19,270  27  0 
                              Mean value across banks  1,599,723  1,977,955  3,129,760 
                              Number of  observations  247  170  107 
                              Share of total bank lending  0.15  0.11  0.07 
     C&I loans        Median value across banks   4,839  0  0 
                              Mean value across banks  866,359  942,215  1,236,887 
                              Number of observations  247  170  107 
                              Share of total C&I lending  0.08  0.05  0.03 
Abs(Net due)/ total foreign loans        
                               Median value across banks  0.70  1.01  0.98 
                               Aggregate ratio  0.26  0.35  0.84 
 
Net due to/from indicate the position of the domestic offices of a bank relative to all of the bank's Edge and 
Agreement subsidiaries, foreign branches, consolidated foreign subsidiaries, and branches in Puerto Rico and U.S. 
territories and possessions (schedule RC-H from form FFIEC 031 – Call Report). A positive net due to indicates 
that the head office owes funds to its foreign offices.  A positive net due from indicates that the head office is owed 
funds from its foreign offices.  Foreign loans are the total loans booked by the foreign offices of U.S. global banks.  
 
 
 Table 3 Lending Channel for Large Domestic and Large Globally-Oriented Banks 
Summed monetary variable effect on first-stage regression betas 
[Prob > chi2 that summed coefficients=0] 
 
Total Bank Lending 








































Total C&I Lending 










































This table presents results from regressions where the dependent variable is the time series of estimated 
coefficients on the liquidity to asset ratio in quarterly cross-sectional regressions where the dependent variable 
was either growth in total bank loans or total C&I loans.  The reported figures in the columns are from the sum 
of the estimated coefficients on the eight lags of each respective monetary policy variables. The Bernanke-
Mihov index has been modified from the original so that all three monetary policy indicators signal tightening 
when they increase. Reported in brackets are the probability that the sum of the coefficients is significantly 
different from zero. The upper panel reports results from estimations where the dependent variable in the first-
stage regressions was total lending growth. The lower panel reports results from estimations where the 
dependent variable in the first-stage regressions was total C&I lending growth. The first two columns reports 
results for the group of large domestic banks. The last two columns report results for the group of large, global 
banks. Odd columns refer to second-stage specifications without GDP controls, while even columns to 
specifications including GDP controls. Bold indicates statistical significance at least at the 10 percent level. 
Sample period: 1980:Q1-2005:Q4. Standard errors are computed with an 8-lags Newey-West correction for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 4  Monetary Policy and Net Due to Parent Banks from Foreign Affiliates 
 
  Real  net inflows to parent 







Tighter  money   Looser money 























This table presents results from regressions where the dependent variable is the quarterly real change in 
net due flows from foreign affiliates to the head office. The reported figures in the columns are from the 
sum of the estimated coefficients on the eight lags of each respective monetary policy variables. The 
Bernanke-Mihov index has been modified from the original so that all three monetary policy indicators 
signal tightening when they increase. Reported in brackets are the probabilities that the sum of the 
coefficients is significantly different from zero.  Bold indicates statistical significance at least at the 10 
percent level. Sample period: 1980:Q1-2005:Q4. Standard errors are computed with an 8-lags Newey-
West correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 5  Monetary Policy and Foreign Lending 
Summed monetary variable effect on first stage betas 




Total Foreign C&I Lending  Total Foreign Lending 






































This table presents results from regressions where the dependent variable is the time series of estimated 
coefficients on the liquidity to asset ratio in quarterly cross-sectional regressions where the dependent variable was 
either growth in total bank loans or total C&I loans of the foreign offices of global banks.  The reported figures in 
the columns are from the sum of the estimated coefficients on the eight lags of each respective monetary policy 
variables. The Bernanke-Mihov index has been modified from the original so that all three monetary policy 
indicators signal tightening when they increase. Reported in brackets are the probabilities that the sum of the 
coefficients is significantly different from zero. The first two columns report results from estimations where the 
dependent variable in the first-stage regressions was total lending growth of foreign offices. The last two columns 
report results from estimations where the dependent variable in the first-stage regressions was total C&I lending 
growth of foreign offices.  Odd columns refer to second-stage specifications without GDP controls, while even 
columns to specifications including GDP controls. Bold  indicates statistical significance at least at the 10 percent 
level. Sample period: 1980:Q1-2005:Q4. Standard errors are computed with an 8-lags Newey-West correction for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  
 
  35Table 6  Results for Small Affiliated with Domestic or Globally-Oriented Banks 
Summed monetary variable effect on first-stage regression betas 
 [Prob > chi2 that summed coefficients=0] 
 
 
Total Bank Lending 
Small in Domestic Banks  Small in Global Banks 
 
no gdp controls  with gdp 
controls 


































Total C&I Lending 
Small in Domestic Banks  Small in Global Banks 
 
no gdp controls  with gdp 
controls 


































This table presents results from regressions where the dependent variable is the time series of estimated   
coefficients on the net income to loan ratio in quarterly cross-sectional regressions where the dependent variable 
was either growth in total bank loans or total C&I loans.  The reported figures in the columns are from the sum 
of the estimated coefficients on the eight lags of each respective monetary policy variables. The Bernanke-
Mihov index has been modified from the original so that all three monetary policy indicators signal tightening 
when they increase. Reported in brackets are the probabilities that the sum of the coefficients is significantly 
different from zero. The upper panel reports results from estimations where the dependent variable in the first-
stage regressions was total lending growth. The lower panel reports results from estimations where the 
dependent variable in the first-stage regressions was total C&I lending growth. The first two columns reports 
results for the group of small banks members of BHCs where there is at least one large domestic bank and no 
global banks. The last two columns report results for the group of small banks members of BHCs where there is 
at least one large global bank. Odd columns refer to second-stage specifications without GDP controls, while 
even columns to specifications including GDP controls. Bold  indicates statistical significance at least at the 10 
percent level. Sample period: 1980:Q1-2005:Q4. Standard errors are computed with an 8-lags Newey-West 
correction for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
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Appendix Table 1: Correlations of Measures of Monetary Policy 
   Correlation 1980Q1 to 2005Q4 
  Nominal Federal  Real Federal  Bernanke-Mihov 
   Funds Rate  Funds Rate  Measure 
Nominal Federal Funds Rate  1       
Real Federal Funds Rate  0.71  1    
Bernanke-Mihov Measure  0.41  0.14  1 
 
The Bernanke-Mihov index has been modified from the original so that all three monetary policy 
indicators signal tightening when they increase.  